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This paper attempts to explain the negative correlation between stock market returns in 
the United States (measured by the risk premium of the S&P 500 Index) and the respective 
volatility of these returns. The academic research regarding two primary schools of thought on 
this issue, the volatility feedback effect and the leverage effect, is furthered as potential 
explanations for this phenomenon. A tertiary explanation relating to investor behavior is also 
explored as a viable cause. In order to empirically study this relationship, I examine the risk 
premium quintiles and the corresponding CBOE Volatility Index levels for the time-series dating 
from January 2, 1990 to June 29, 2018. This approach differentiates from the stochastic and 
autoregressive volatility models that attempt to explain this relationship, by examining the 
distribution of the negative return-volatility correlation. Results from this analysis serve to better 

















Volatility has long had its place in the financial markets. Defined in a general sense as the 
standard deviation of asset returns (usually annualized), it provides an important metric of 
dispersion that investors can use to guide their decisions. An essential distinction, however, is 
that volatility is not equivalent to risk. Premier investor Warren Buffet spoke of this from a more 
macro standpoint, stating that equities will always be a more volatile asset class than cash-
equivalents, but that does not mean they are riskier (Buffet, 2014). He was referring to the 
common practice of aligning risk with volatility, despite risk reflecting downside fluctuations 
and volatility representing fluctuations in both directions. Volatility, hence, has no information 
regarding the shape of equity returns (Poon, 2005). 
While volatility as a concept appears rather simple in nature, it in itself has several 
variations that should be distinguished. It can vary across different asset classes as Buffet noted, 
different individual securities, as well as across different lengths of time. It also can be referred 
to as realized volatility, having occurred across a historical time horizon, or as implied volatility, 
an estimate for the volatility at a future point in time. For this paper, the volatility in question 
will be measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index, referred to 
as the VIX.  
 
VIX 
As the primary metric in study, an overview of the VIX is warranted. The CBOE 
Volatility Index measures the implied volatility of the S&P 500 Index with an average expiration 
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of 30 days. It uses near-term (weekly) and next-term (monthly) call and put options with 23 to 37 
days to expiration, and calculates a weighted 30-day variance. Upon taking the square root of 
this variance and multiplying by 100, the result is the VIX level noted on the index (CBOE, n.d.) 
Quoted in percentage points, it represents the expected standard deviation of the S&P 500 Index 
over the next year -- at a 68% confidence level or one standard deviation. It is of note that the 
VIX has been observed to overestimate the volatility of the stock market when compared to the 
realized volatility for the respective time horizon, a phenomenon referred to as the volatility or 
variance premium. This premium, as measured by implied minus realized volatility, averages 
approximately 3% (Eraker, 2007). The VIX will be used as a proxy for conditional or implied 
volatility throughout this paper. A graph of the VIX is found below, spanning from 1990 until 
present day. 
 







This forward-looking, option-derived metric possesses an incredibly interesting 
characteristic that has long been a subject of interest in academic research -- it is highly 
negatively correlated to the stock market’s returns. As illustrated by the figure above, the VIX 
tends to spike significantly during recessions and fall during strong bull markets. Two schools of 
thought dominate the aforementioned relationship. The first, the volatility feedback effect, 
primarily stemmed from French, Schwert, and Stambaugh in 1987. Their premise was that as 
volatility increases, the required rate of return for the security increases, thus further discounting 
the cash flows and lowering the stock price. (French, Schwert, Stambaugh 1987). Additional 
analysis between the weighted average cost of capital for a large-cap equity sample and 
accompanying VIX levels indicate support for this claim, as well as academic research on price 
shocks and their volatility impact. The second school of thought regarding this relationship is 
referred to as the leverage effect. First introduced by Fischer Black in 1976, the leverage effect 
was theorized to occur when there was a decline in stock price, which would then increase the 
relative level of leverage at the firm level -- leading to further volatility (Black, 1976). This 
effect faced both support and opposition, however, as it was found to vary upon the time horizon 
in study, and failed to incorporate all-equity financed companies. Lastly, a third explanation for 
the return-volatility association appeals to the behavioral aspects of investing, citing the 
investor’s tendency for loss aversion as a cause for the asymmetry.  
While these theories have been extended to international equities, applied to high-
frequency data, and modeled in several environments, the distribution of the return-volatility 
association lacks significant exploration. My analysis of using a quintile and decile approach 
sheds light on the asymmetry of this already asymmetric relationship, while providing validation 
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to its extreme nature. The concentration of correlations in extreme quintiles in this time series 
provide support for primarily the volatility feedback effect, which favors large short-term 
changes in asset prices and volatility. These findings can then be applied to the ever-increasing 
securitized volatility market, with implications in hedging, arbitrage, and predictive strategies.  
 
VOLATILITY FEEDBACK EFFECT   
 
The premise of volatility having a negative relationship with stock market returns due to 
some kind of “feedback” has been the focal point of several prominent financial scholars. 
French, Schwert and Stambaugh first explore this relationship in the context of expected returns 
and volatility, finding a positive relationship. They claim that this then induces a negative 
relationship between realized returns and “unpredicted” (i.e. implied) volatility, in which an 
increase in volatility feeds back into each firm by requiring a higher discount rate. Cash flows 
remaining unchanged, the increased discount rate would lower the net present value of the firm --
and thus the current stock price in accordance with a discounted cash flow methodology (French, 
Schwert, Stambaugh 1987). 
Additionally pivotal to their findings was their methodology for returns. Rather than 
using the stock market returns for their indices in study, the market risk premium was used in its 
place. Concordant with Fama and French’s Three Factor Model, the market risk premium 
accounts for different interest rate regimes, as well as the expected equity return in excess of the 
risk-free security rate (Fama, French 1992). The market risk premium (equity premium) is often 




Unaddressed by French, Schwert, and Stambaugh, however, was the question as to what 
would cause the initial changes in volatility. Volatility can be impacted on the macro level by 
political events or global economic data, but can also be effected at the firm level by the release 
of company-specific information. The latter was the focus of Campbell and Hentschel, who 
provided the example of a dividend announcement inducing a volatility feedback effect. 
Logically, a “negative” announcement about dividends would increase future volatility because 
of the concept that volatility is persistent. The required rate of return would thus be higher, 
decreasing the stock price and further amplifying the volatility. Likewise, a “positive” 
announcement increases volatility, but the volatility of the stock’s returns is dampened due to a 
higher discount rate. Caught in the midpoint between these two extremes is no news (lack of 
volatility), which was found to increase the stock market return (Campbell, Hentschel 1991).  
In order to provide evidence to the existence of this volatility feedback effect, a 
methodology of modeling the stock returns and volatility must be used. A primary technique first 
used in the context of feedback by Campbell and Hentschel was a generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) process. The crux of this type of model is that it 
assumes error variance is not uniform but rather heteroskedastic. Additionally, the error variance 
is autoregressive; thus it depends on the previous time period’s variance. The GARCH process is 
frequently used to model the volatility of stock market returns, for it exhibits several 
heteroskedastic and autoregressive properties (Ruppert, 2011). 
 
International Evidence 
The use of these models has allowed significant evidence of this effect to compile. On the 
international front, corroboration of this feedback was found in several studies. GARCH models 
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for the volatility of indices in Hong Kong and Taiwan markets (Hong Kong Hang Seng Index 
and Taiwan Stock Exchange Weighted Index) provide support for an asymmetric volatility-
return relationship (Yeh, Lee 2000). Using a sample period from May 22, 1992 to August 27, 
1996, it was found that the impact of a negative unexpected shock (i.e. bad news) on future 
volatility was significantly larger than the impact of a positive unexpected shock (good news) -- 
indicating an asymmetric relationship attributable to volatility feedback. Additional international 
evidence can be found in emerging markets, specifically in India. Equities in emerging markets 
are essential to consider because of their different properties from typical developed countries 
and economies. These differences include a low correlation with developed markets, more 
predictable returns, higher average returns, and higher volatility (Bekaert and Wu, 2000). These 
distinguishable properties thus pose a potential resistance to the existence of this particular 
effect. Using closing stock price data for the primary index in India (the BSE 500 Index) from 
July 26, 2000 to January 20, 2009, asymmetric volatility was found to indeed still be prevalent in 
India, confident at the 1% level when modeled through a nonlinear asymmetric model (GARCH) 
(Goudarzi, Ramanarayanan 2011). The same occurrence of negative shocks inducing more 
volatility than a positive shock attributed to the existence of a feedback effect, despite different 
equity market characteristics.         
 
Extreme Cases 
In order to further examine the validity of the volatility feedback effect, it is important to 
consider the extremes; i.e. the extreme downside movements in stock market prices and volatility 
levels. Wagner and Aboura (2010) use sample data from January 2, 2000 to September 30, 2008, 
comprised of S&P 500 Index and the aforementioned CBOE Volatility Index closing levels -- 
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which includes extreme observations from the dotcom bubble, 9/11 terrorist attacks, as well as 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Using a GARCH model for these volatility-shock periods, they 
found significantly stronger evidence of volatility asymmetry in which VIX spikes corresponded 
with large market price drawdowns; more so than normal volatility levels (Wagner, Aboura 
2010). The exaggerated asymmetry during periods of financial or economic shock provides 
evidence that a specific effect, namely “extreme volatility feedback”, is causing the conditional 
volatility to spike in response to a large drop in security prices.  
Many of the aforementioned studies examined price data of the S&P 500 Index using 
daily prices across several years, occurring decades in the past. The environment and nature of 
the United States equity market and equity markets worldwide, however, have changed 
significantly. As of 2017, quantitative and passive investing accounted for about 60% of trades in 
the United States. Of the segment comprising quantitative investing, high frequency trading 
accounts for 52% of the 60% -- with technology and speeds nonexistent a decade earlier (Cheng 
2017). Understanding the volatility-return relationship requires an analysis of this high-
frequency data, in order to see its implications for the validity of effects like the volatility 
feedback effect. Such analysis could also assist in explaining the causality and timing of the 
relationship: Under the feedback effect does higher volatility lead to lower returns, or do lower 
returns lead to higher volatility?  
In their study of the leverage and volatility effects, Bollerslev, Litvinova, and Tauchen 
address these essential issues. In order to obtain high frequency data, they used tick-by-tick S&P 
500 futures data from January 4, 1998 to March 9, 1999 because of the trading frequency and 
low trading costs in this market. They discovered that asymmetric volatility did in fact appear, in 
which large declines in five-minute S&P 500 futures data were accompanied by a spike in 
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market volatility (Bollerslev, Litvinova, Tauchen (2006). Their findings came to question, 
however, the logistics and practicality of the volatility feedback effect. How could companies be 
revising their required rate of return (which would thus lower the stock price) on a tick-by-tick 
basis? Or does the market instantly price in volatility changes as immediate revisions to costs of 
capital? Perhaps the explanation is another effect, or combination of effects, entirely.   
 
Empirical Test    
A potential way to determine the validity of the volatility feedback effect is to examine 
the relationship between the aggregate weighted average cost of capital of a group of firms (or an 
index), and the VIX. According to the volatility feedback effect, these two should be positively 
correlated -- as volatility increases, the cost of capital rises as a result. Using a random sample of 
10 companies from the Dow Jones Industrial Index and standardized values for the VIX and 
WACC on a three month basis from March 31, 2000 to December 31, 2018, the resulting 







While not significant at the 95% level, the positive association between the standardized 
values of the VIX and the average of 10 Dow Jones Industrial Index companies’ weighted 
average cost of capital provides some insight as to the relevance of the volatility feedback effect. 
A larger sample of firms, as well as more frequent data for WACC values could yield results in 




A competing school of thought for the explanation behind the volatility-return 
relationship in equities is referred to as the leverage effect. First defined by Fischer Black in his 
paper Studies of Stock Prices Volatility Changes, it cites leverage as the primary reason for stock 
return volatility. The reasoning is as follows: As a firm experiences a decline in price (and thus 
in its market value of equity), its relative amount of debt compared to equity increases. With 
more leverage, the firm is likely to be more volatile, consistent with the well-documented 
research between debt/equity ratios and volatility (Black, 1976). The following figure (Figure 2) 
illustrates this relationship, sorting firms by leverage decile and plotting against monthly 
volatility of equity (Chorro et al., 2018). It is important to note that while the extreme deciles of 
leverage do experience higher equity volatility, it is difficult to ascertain a relationship between 








    
 
While Black’s theory appeals logically, the explanatory power of the leverage effect was 
found to be rather limited -- if present at all. The study by Chorro et al. examined the returns of 
the S&P 500 Index over a 25-year time horizon, using a GARCH model to disentangle the 
leverage effect’s contribution to the asymmetrical volatility-return relationship. In line with the 
plot illustrated above, leverage effects were found to be a statistically relevant characteristic in 
only 30% of firms in the S&P 500. When viewed in aggregate as compared to at a firm level, the 
explanatory contribution of the leverage effect decreased even more so.  
The implications of financial leverage impacting returns and volatility in an asymmetric 
manner also rely on the time horizon in question. Pan and Liu utilize several extensions of 
GARCH models to examine the short-term and long-term impacts of leverage on volatility, using 
historical daily closing levels of the S&P 500 Index from January 2, 1991 to December 31, 2015. 
They concluded that the leverage effect existed in some manner for the short-term, but lacked 
statistical significance in the long-term. Additionally, negative shocks to the S&P 500 index had 
a much larger effect on volatility via the leverage effect than shocks in the positive direction 
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(Pan, Liu 2017). Much like the analysis for the volatility feedback effect, however, the impact of 
the effect could be different when examined over an even shorter horizon: high frequency. Due 
to the noise associated with high frequency data including bid-ask variations, liquidity 
constraints, and trading mechanics, disentangling these biases has proved difficult for researchers 
(Ait-Sahali, Fan, Li 2011). Using a new class of models called multivariate high-frequency-
based volatility models (abbreviated HEAVY), however, Noureldin, Shephard, and Sheppard 
were able to find evidence for the leverage effect in high frequency data while accounting for 
this noise (Noureldin et al., 2011). The authors do not separate this effect from the volatility 
feedback effect, however, and thus one must approach their estimations with caution. 
The general conclusion amongst scholars regarding the leverage effect is that it has some 
explanatory merit for the asymmetric volatility puzzle, but not as much as the volatility feedback 
effect or other underlying characteristics. Some, however, make the claim that this relationship is 
not due to leverage at all. If the leverage effect explains the negative relationship between 
volatility and stock market returns, then companies with no financial leverage should exhibit 
different return-volatility relationships than their levered counterparts. This was the premise of 
Hasanhodzic and Lo in their study of all-equity financed firms from 1972 to December 2008. 
They found an equally strong (if not stronger) negative relationship between stock returns and 
their respective volatility for these all-equity financed firms when compared to the study’s 
universe of levered companies (Hasanhodzic and Lo, 2011). They thus directly dispute Black’s 
claim that leverage plays an explanatory role in the return-volatility relationship. The leverage 
effect therefore appeals logically but appears to contribute little to nothing towards the 





        
While mathematical models for volatility have adduced explanatory power to the 
volatility feedback effect, and to some extent the leverage effect, much about the relationship 
remains unexplained. This has led some to claim that the underlying cause of asymmetric 
volatility may be simply due to the nature of investor behavior.  
The CBOE Volatility Index (VIX), despite being a measure of aggregate implied 
volatility, has become known as the “Fear Gauge”. It has in some cases become synonymous 
with risk, and yet does not fit risk’s own definition. The reasoning behind this is likely due to 
investor behavior. In an examination of past volatility’s effect on investor’s future judgements, 
Du and Budescu displayed historical data for 80 stocks to participants in the study, and asked 
them to forecast the prices of these stocks in the future. They found a negative relationship 
between volatility and forecasts, meaning that for stocks with higher volatility, individuals 
underestimated the actual price of the stock in the future (Du and Budescu, 2007). These 
implications could feasibly be carried out in the stock market and pose an explanation to the 
volatility asymmetry. As volatility increases, an investor’s expected return for a stock decreases 
or the stock is avoided altogether (sold or lack of demand), thus lowering the price of the stock. 
This concept of loss aversion is highly related to volatility. Loss aversion refers to the 
tendency to have a higher sensitivity to losses as opposed to gains (Barberis and Huang, 2001). 
While volatility merely represents the standard deviation of stock returns, investors in 
accordance to loss aversion would be more wary of larger variations because they represent the 
possibility of a larger loss. Since the relationship in study is between realized returns and 
conditional (implied) volatility, the negative association becomes even stronger. As stock prices 
16 
 
decrease, investors are highly sensitive to the loss and thus forecast future volatility to be even 
higher. Reversing the causality, as volatility increases, the potential for a larger loss rises and 
stock prices drop to reflect the loss aversion. While this explanation is linked to the previous two 
effects tied to asymmetric volatility, it differs in the sense that the aversion is present at the 
investor level, as compared to at the firm level. 
Asymmetric volatility at the market level is the crux behind behavioral explanations for 
its causation. Hibbert et al. cite “affect heuristics” (rules of thumb or practices based on 
instinct/intuition) as a factor in the negative return-volatility relationship. The aforementioned 
loss aversion, for instance, is the primary affect heuristic in the focus of their analysis. Investors 
trading on behalf of this heuristic influences the demand for equities, as they are more likely to 
purchase stocks during non-volatile markets and sell them during volatile ones (Hibbert et al, 
2008). This further carries over to the derivatives market (and subsequently the VIX), as traders 
bid up prices for put options and ultimately implied volatility through extrapolation bias. They 
argue that due to the fact that this relationship was occurring contemporaneously and with such 
strong correlations in the tails, that this must be behavior driven and not the result a lagged effect 




In order to truly understand the underlying cause of the negative relationship between 
volatility and stock market returns, one must examine the association itself. Concordant with 
French, Schwert, and Stambaugh in their analysis of volatility asymmetry, this paper uses the 
market risk premium as a proxy for returns, because it takes into account several interest rate 
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regimes throughout the sample range of January 2, 1990 to June 29, 2018. This paper also uses 
the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) in reference to volatility, examining it in the context of implied 
or conditional volatility. In agreement with Hibbert et al, the VIX provides a suitable 
measurement for conditional volatility because of its inclusion of options extending across a 
variety of strike prices and its constantly updating implied volatilities. 
When the values of the change in the VIX and the risk premium are standardized and 
plotted, the negative relationship becomes quite clear (Figure 3). Spanning over the 
aforementioned time horizon, the correlation between the two variables is a staggering -0.789. 
Examining the direction of the S&P 500 index returns on a daily basis compared to the VIX 
yields similar results. From January 2, 1990 to March 3, 2019, the S&P 500 Index and the VIX 
moved in opposite directions 77.79% of the time. The following table describes these 
movements.  






With such consistent movement in the opposite direction, one would expect a 
significantly negative beta to the market. This is indeed the case, with a beta over the same span 
of -4.288, using daily closing SPX and VIX data. This beta also changes depending on the type 
of market. For example, for the sample period from January 1990 to February 2010, the beta of 
the VIX versus the S&P 500 Index was -2.2 in bull markets, - 3.9 in bear markets, and -3.5 
overall (Stanton, 2011). 
The distribution of this relationship provides further insights. While much is documented 
about the negative relationship between returns and conditional volatility, little is discussed 
about the asymmetry of this relationship itself, rather than the relationship of solely volatility. 
There are a few scholarly works that do address the fact that the relationship between returns and 
volatility is nonlinear -- and thus becomes more significant during extreme shocks or periods 
(Hibbert et al, 2008). Their focus is primarily on the downside case, in which large decreases in 
the stock market price cause spikes in volatility through effects such as feedback or leverage. 
This paper’s research expands beyond this view to incorporate the whole relationship -- why 
does volatility decrease (increase) by an almost equal amount during a positive return shock 
versus a negative one in absolute terms? 
As mentioned previously, an essential part of the volatility-return relationship is that it is 
nonlinear. If it was linear, then the impact of a negative return of one percent on volatility would 
have a proportionate impact as a five percent negative return, and this is not the case. Following 
the methodology of the Federal Reserve, a way to test for this relationship is through the 
volatility of volatility; i.e. the derivative (Park, 2015). The CBOE VVIX (volatility of volatility) 
Index derives its value using the same methodology as the VIX, except for the fact that it uses 
VIX options instead of options from the S&P 500 Index (CBOE, n.d.). Plotted against the VIX, a 
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positive relationship between the VIX and the VVIX would indicate that stock market volatility 
is a nonlinear construct. The figure below illustrates the relationship from January 2, 1990 to 
March 8, 2019 of their standardized daily returns, with an R-squared value of .56 and a test 





With nonlinearity established in the relationship between stock returns and conditional 
volatility, examining the risk premium quintiles provides insight as to which periods or days are 
contributing to this overall negative correlation. For this analysis, each risk premium and 
volatility value on a daily basis were treated as a pair in the time series. Each quintile represents 
the group of risk premium-volatility pairs that fell into the particular percentile ranking. As 
illustrated by the plots in Appendix 1-5, the second, third, and fourth quintile display little to no 
relationship between the change in volatility and the change in the risk premium. The first 
quintile (lowest returns) and fifth quintile (highest returns), however, have a very strong negative 
association. The table below summarizes the results for the following regression per quintile, 
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controlling for the Fama French Factors of SMB (market capitalization) and HML (book to 
market ratios).  
Where: 
𝒚𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝒗𝒊𝒙𝒕 + 𝜷𝒔𝒎𝒃𝒕 +  𝜷𝒉𝒎𝒍𝒕 + 𝜺𝒕 
𝒚𝒕 = The standardized market risk premium at time t 
𝜷 = The parameter of interest to estimate the relationship between different factors and the 
market risk premium 
𝒗𝒊𝒙𝒕 = The standardized value of the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) at time t. 
𝒔𝒎𝒃𝒕 = The standardized value of the aggregate SMB factor returns for the S&P 500 Index at   
time t 





   *** indicates statistically significant at the 99% confidence level 
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Similar results appear when analyzing the correlations of the market risk premium of the 
S&P 500 Index versus the VIX from a decile perspective (Figure 5). The first and tenth deciles 
both exhibit the strong negative correlation described in academic literature, but the second 
through ninth decile exhibit very weak negative correlations with hardly any relationship at all. It 
is the tenth decile that is of particular interest. Why does the VIX react so strongly negative to 





This finding contrasts several of the assumptions made earlier that helped support the 
effects explaining asymmetric volatility. For instance, Campbell and Hentschel in their work 
illustrating the volatility feedback effect relied upon the concept that volatility is persistent. 
Thus, forecasted volatility is conditional on today’s volatility levels, and can often exhibit 
momentum-like properties. This appears to be the case for the first quintile or decile, in which 
large spikes in present-day volatility (via large negative stock returns) can reverberate into larger 
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implied volatilities in the future. However, a large spike in stock return volatility resulting from a 
large increase in the market risk premium actually decreases future volatility, because investors 
now believe there to be less volatility in future. Hwang et al in their study of volatility found a 
lack of support for the persistency of true volatility -- a key input for the GARCH models used to 
demonstrate the volatility feedback and leverage effects (Hwang et. al, 2007). 
In regards to the leverage effect, the distribution of the relationship is better explained. As 
the stock market decreases significantly (1st quintile), the relative level of equity compared to 
debt decreases, causing the volatility to increase. Conversely, as the stock market experiences a 
positive return shock (5th quintile), the leverage ratio decreases due to a larger proportion of 
equity, resulting in lower volatility.  
As the most open-to-interpretation explanation for the return-volatility relationship, the 
investor behavior reasoning may have best chance of capturing the entirety of the relationship 
distribution. Loss aversion does not only affect decisions relating to losses, but also spills over to 
gains. On the negative return side, the investor sensitivity to losses is indicated by the extreme 
volatility that accompanies the extreme negative return shocks in the first quintile and decile. 
The fifth quintile (positive return shocks), however, can potentially be thought of as the 
sensitivity to the lack of losses -- a higher sensitivity than an investor’s sensitivity to gains. A 
large positive return in the stock market signals that the risk of losses has declined, leading to a 








Because the sample period spans nearly 30 years of data, it is also important to examine 
the risk premium – volatility relationship in a historical context, throughout different eras of the 
stock market. The first era in study was from the beginning of the sample (January 2, 1990) to 
the end of the dot-com bubble, which ended at its lowest point at the end of September 2002. 
During this time horizon, the S&P 500 Index returned a compounded annual return of 6.4%, with 
an average VIX level of 19.86. The second era spanned from the endpoint of the dot-com bubble 
to the end of the financial crisis, defined as ending in June 2009 by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER, 2012). While this period did not contain the same amount of trading 
days, it encompassed both the bull market before the Financial Crisis as well as the ensuing 
recession, with an average VIX level of 20.82 and the S&P returning approximately 1.78% 
annually. The last era marked the beginning of a historically long bull market, starting on June 
30, 2009 and spanning to the end of the sample on June 29, 2018. During this period, volatility 
was rather low at an average VIX level of 17.44, while returns were much higher at 12.05% 
annually.  
Using the same approach as the overall relationship analysis, each era was divided into a 
time series of risk-premium and VIX z-scores, which were then separated into quintiles. The 
resulting correlations between the z-scores in each quintile are illustrated below (Figure 6). All 
quintiles largely follow the same relationship as the entire time series, but the second era notably 
contains more extreme correlations in the first and fifth quintile. This was largely the result of 
the Great Recession falling within its sample, in which many extreme values of risk premiums 
and volatility levels occurred. In contrast, the first era lacked as strong of a negative correlation 
overall and in the quintiles of focus, alluding to the fact that the relationship has become stronger 
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over time – perhaps due to increased volume and prevalence of high frequency trading. Further, 
despite the low levels of volatility found in the bull market following the Great Recession, the 
asymmetric relationship between returns and volatility remained very strong, emphasizing the 
prevalence of volatility declines during positive return shocks.        
 
Figure 6. 




The defining characteristic of volatility-based instruments is the fact that they are 
negatively correlated with the stock market and consequently the market risk premium. When 
compared to other major asset classes or factors as listed by the St. Louis Fed hedge fund factors, 
volatility stands alone in this regard. The following table illustrates the correlations of prominent 





   
 
The market of volatility based-instruments has grown substantially over the past decades 
as investors sought to take advantage of the characteristics of stock market volatility. The 
Chicago Board Options Exchange offers Volatility Index Futures in order to utilize as an 
investment or hedging tool. Options on the VIX remain prevalent as well, with millions of 
contracts bought and sold daily. There are also several exchange-traded notes (ETNs) and 
exchange-traded funds (ETF) that attempt to track the VIX as a benchmark through volatility 
futures, or even take leveraged or inverse positions on volatility. For example, the 
VelocityShares Daily 2x Leveraged VIX Short-Term ETN attempts to track twice the return of 
the VIX, and has over $800 million in assets under management (Yahoo Finance, 2019). There 
are many ways to trade volatility -- but it is important to first understand the implications of the 
return-volatility relationship. 
This was not the case for the once-popular inverse volatility exchange traded note XIV, 
which was created by Credit Suisse and had over $2 billion in assets under management. The 
large spike in volatility on February 5, 2018 resulted in a decline in XIV of 85% in one day, 
before being liquidated a few days later after losing most of its value (Franck, 2019). Its downfall 
sheds light on some of the important aspects discussed in this paper. Volatility has a strong 
negative correlation to the market return in aggregate, but the strongest relationship occurs 
within the first and fifth quintiles. Extreme negative return shocks produce even more extreme 
increases in volatility, while large positive return shocks result in extreme decreases in volatility. 
Individuals or institutions investing in inverse volatility ETNs or shorting volatility instruments 
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themselves should be wary of the leverage, feedback, and investor behavior effects that drive the 
asymmetric relationship between stock market returns and conditional volatility. These can lead 




The stock market and volatility, as measured by the VIX, share a very strong negative 
relationship. Two competing schools of research attempt to explain this phenomenon, primarily 
through GARCH models of volatility. The volatility feedback effect finds reason in the process 
of a negative return shock increasing volatility and raising the required return -- thus decreasing 
the price and amplifying the level of volatility. Support has been found in emerging markets in 
India, as well as in high-frequency tick-by-tick data, but lacks full explanation for the 
instantaneousness of cost of capital revisions. A second school of thought, the leverage effect, 
states that as asset prices decline, the debt to equity ratio increases, resulting in increased 
volatility. This effect has significantly less explanatory power, and is called into question by 
firms that are all-equity financed and still display the same characteristics of return-volatility 
relationships. A final explanation encompasses several ideas through general investor behavior. 
Because investors are more sensitive to losses, the potential of larger decreases in stock prices 
due to higher volatility serves as reason to cause the negative relationship between returns and 
volatility.    
This paper furthers the academic research on these effects by taking a quintile and decile 
approach, in order to examine the distribution of the volatility asymmetry. The relationship was 
found to be nonlinear, with the first and fifth quintiles (i.e. the extremes) of the risk premium 
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correlating the most negatively with the corresponding volatility time-series. These findings do 
not appeal completely to the volatility feedback effect, particularly in the extreme positive 
shocks to returns. They are better explained by the leverage and investor behavior effects, in 
which the strong negative correlations in extreme quintiles could be a result of leverage or loss 
aversion. They also have significant implications on the large volatility instrument market, in 
which they help explain the extreme losses of certain exchange-traded notes, and provide 
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